晋城市人民政府办公厅批转市物价局《晋城市房地产价格管理实施办法（试行）的通知
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晋城市人民政府办公厅批转市物价局《晋城市房地产价格管理实施办法（试行）的通知
晋城市人民政府办公厅批转市物价局《晋城市房地产价格管理实施办法（试行）的通知
晋市政办（1992）117号
1992年10月10日
各县（区）人民政府、市直各有关单位：
房地产业是国民经济的重要基础产业，房地产价格是整个价格体系中的重要组成部分。加强房地产价格管理，对推进住房制度改革，促进房地产健康发展，开拓新的市场领域，发展我国社会主义市场经济，具有十分重要的意义。
现将市物价局《晋城市房地产价格管理实施办法（试行）》批转给你们，望认真贯彻执行。
晋城市房地产价格管理实施办法（试行）
第一条：房地产业是国民经济的重要基础产业，房地产价格是整个价格体系的重要组成部分，为加强房地产价格管理，维护房地产市场价格秩序，推进住房制度改革顺利进行，保护合法的房地产经营活动，更好地发挥价格杠杆的经济调节功能，促进房地产业的健康发展，根据国家物价局（1992）价费字239号、国家物价局、建设部（1992）价费字192号和省物价局晋价涉字（1992）第154号、省物价局、省城建厅晋价涉字（1992）第181号文件精神，制定本施办法。
第二条：晋城市物价局是全市房地产价格管理的主管部门，统一管理全市房地产价格工作。
第三条：晋城市房地产价格管理工作的基本任务是，在市政府领导下，按照国家法律、法规和政策规定，合理规范商品住宅价格构成，整顿房地产交易市场价格秩序，规范房地产价格行为，对晋城地区的房地产价格进行管理。
第四条：晋城市房地产价格管理工作范围：
（一）管理晋城地区的商品房价格，房地产交易价格、公有住房租金和出售价格以及房地产管理部门管理、服务收费标准。
（二）对属于国家定价、国家指导价的房地产价格进行核批，办理行政裁定前的事务性工作，并接受委托受理其它房地产价格业务。
（三）参与土地部门及房地产管理部门对土地使用权的出让、转让价格的管理。
（四）派员进驻房地产交易市场，对房地产市场价格执行情况进行监测。
第五条：房地产价格管理形式
实行国家定价、国家指导价和市场调节价三种价格形式。
（一）国家定价范围包括：（1）新开发商品房销售价格；（2）公有住房售价和租金标准；（3）土地使用权的出让、转让、租凭价格；（4）房地产管理、服务收费标准。
（二）国家指导价范围包括：（1）公有非住宅用房出售价格和租金；（2）房地产抵押、拍卖、典当价格；（3）企业兼任、入股、合资、倒闭等房地产价格；（4）司法机关办理有关房地产案件的价格等。
（三）市场调节价范围包括：除国家定价和国家指导价目以外的其它房地产价格和收费标准。
第六条：组成晋城市房地产价格评估组，负责房地产价格评估。价格评估组属有关部门级成的松散机构，是在物价行政部门裁定价格前，审核员地产价格构成因素，提出可行性价格意见的咨询性组织。价格评估组实行有偿评估，评估费收取标准按省有关规定执行。价格评估组由市场价局牵头，吸收市计委、体改委、建设局、土地局、审计局、建设银行和国有资产管理局参加，评估组下设办公室，具体负责日常事务性工作，办公室设在市物价局。
第七条：凡城镇规划区内（含建制镇和工矿区）各种房地产的买卖（含出让转证）租凭、抵押、拍卖、典当等交易行为，均需进入房地产交易市场。除商品房、集资房价格由房地产价格评估组进行评估外，其它房屋价格由物价部门和房地产部门进行评估。对属于其中第五条纳入国家定价和国家指导价管理范围的，评估后需经物价部门审查批准，擅自制定或越权制定房地产价格，按违反《中华人民共和国价格管理条例》论处。
第八条：房地产易市场的价格评估原则，评估费和交易市场管理费以及所收费用分配比例，按国家物价局、建设部（1992）价费字192号和省物价局，省城乡建设环境保护厅晋价湛涉字（1992）第181号文件规定执行。
第九条：市物价局直接管理市区和矿区的房地产价格。市辖各县由县按本办法制定实施细则。
第十条：本实施办法由市物价局负责解释。
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韶关市区生活饮用水二次供水管理规定
韶关市区生活饮用水二次供水管理规定（韶府令第107号）
《韶关市区生活饮用水二次供水管理规定》（韶府规审〔2013〕5号）已经2013年8月14日韶关市人民政府第十三届27次政府常务会议通过，现予发布，自发布之日起执行，有效期5年。
市长 艾学峰
2013年9月3日
韶关市区生活饮用水二次供水管理规定
第一条 为加强本市生活饮用水二次供水管理，预防生活饮用水污染，保证二次供水水质符合国家《生活饮用水卫生标准》（GB5749—2006），保障人民身体健康，根据《中华人民共和国传染病防治法》、《城市供水条例》、《二次供水设施卫生规范》（GB 17051─1997）、中华人民共和国建设部、卫生部《生活饮用水卫生监督管理办法》、中华人民共和国建设部《城市供水水质管理规定》等法律法规，结合本市实际，制定本规定。
第二条 本规定所称的生活饮用水二次供水(以下简称二次供水），是指单位或者个人使用储存、加压等设施，将城市供水或者自建设施供水经储存、加压后再供用户的供水形式。
第三条 凡在本市市区范围内对二次供水设施进行设计、建造、保洁和使用的单位和个人，适用本规定。
第四条 市城市综合管理局是本市区二次供水管理的行政主管部门，负责二次供水设施的行政管理；市卫生局负责二次供水的卫生监督管理；市住房和城乡建设局负责新建、改建、扩建二次供水设施建筑工程施工的监督管理；二次供水其它相关单位，应当按照各自的职责，协同做好二次供水管理工作。
第五条 二次供水设施的设计应当符合国家有关技术标准和规范，并由具有相应资质的单位按设计进行施工。
第六条 二次供水设施竣工后，建设单位应当对其进行调试与验收。二次供水设施的竣工验收应有建设、卫生、二次供水行政主管部门参加。
二次供水设施取得卫生许可后，方可投入使用。
第七条 二次供水设施产权单位或其委托的管理单位负责对二次供水设施的日常使用进行管理，并履行下列职责：
（一）建立水质管理制度和安全防范措施，有专职或兼职的管理人员负责具体管理，并建立完善的管理档案；
（二）水池或水箱应封盖加锁，并保持二次供水设施周围的环境卫生；
（三）每半年至少对二次供水设施进行一次全面的清洗、消毒，并将消毒后的二次供水水样送有资质的水质检测机构检测。
（四）确保二次供水设施使用的各种净水、除垢、消毒材料必须符合国家卫生标准；
（五）二次供水水质受到污染时，供水企业或二次供水设施管理单位应当采取妥善处理措施；确需停止供水的，应当报经市供水行政主管部门批准，并提前24小时通知用水单位和个人；因发生灾害或者紧急事故，不能提前通知的，应当在采取应急措施的同时，通知用水单位和个人，并向市供水行政主管部门报告。
第八条 二次供水设施的清洗消毒工作，可委托二次供水设施保洁维修专业单位承担，并签订清洗消毒合同。
第九条 从事二次供水设施保洁维修的专业单位，必须取得市卫生行政管理部门的卫生许可后方可从事相应业务。
第十条 从事二次供水设施的保洁维修专业单位，应做好下列工作：
（一）建立用户的二次供水设施资料档案，并把每次清洗保洁、维护的工作记录归档，做好跟踪服务；
（二）每次维护、清洗、消毒、完毕，须提示用户将水样送至有资质的水质检测机构检测；
（三）保证清洗消毒后的水质符合饮用水卫生要求。
第十一条 二次供水设施的清洗消毒费用和水质送检费用由受益单位或受益户负责。二次供水设施清洗消毒、水质检测等收费标准，按物价部门核定的收费标准执行。
第十二条 直接从事二次供水的管理人员和二次供水设施清洗、消毒人员，必须经过卫生知识培训和健康检查，取得健康合格证后方可上岗。
第十三条 二次供水设施保洁维修专业单位所使用的清洁用具、清洗剂、除垢剂、消毒剂等必须符合国家卫生标准，防止饮用水的二次污染。
第十四条 违反下列规定的，由市城市供水行政主管部门责令其限期改正，并补办相关手续：
（一）违反本规定第六条的规定，二次供水设施产权单位未取得卫生许可而从事供水活动的；
（二）违反本规定第九条的规定，从事二次供水设施保洁维修的专业单位未取得卫生许可而从事二次供水保洁活动的。
第十五条 本规定自发布之日起施行，有效期5年。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
